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I. INTRODUCTION
The Ohio Supreme Court's decision in Berdyck v. Shinde2 brings to a head the
problem in understanding superseding cause in Ohio. After extensively
discussing of the evolution and expansion of a nurse's duty in Ohio, the Court,
states:
Thus we hold that the intervening negligence of an attending
physician does not absolve a hospital of its prior negligence if both
cooperated in proximately causing an injury to the patient and no
break occurred in the chain of causation between the hospital's
negligence and the resulting injury. In order to break the chain, the
intervening negligence of the physician must be disconnected from the
negligence of the hospital and must be of itself an efficient,
independent and self-producing cause of the patient's injury.3
The question which naturally arises is whether the determination of
superseding cause in this context is a question for the jury. Ohio case law has
1Dr. Lattanzi received his J.D. summa cum laude in 1993 from the
Cleveland-Marshall College of Law where he served as Articles Editor for the Cleveland
State Law Review. He received his M.D. in 1979 from the Albany Medical College and
completed his urologic training in 1994 at the Cleveland Clinic Foundation. He is board
certified in urology and is a Fellow in the American College of Legal Medicine. He has
authored articles in both medical and legal literature.
Dr. Lattanzi is currently an attorney with the firm of Greene & McQuillan Co.,
L.P.A. where his practice is concentrated in the area of medical malpractice litigation.
He was admitted to the Ohio Bar in 1993 and is a member of the Ohio and Cleveland
Bar Associations and the Ohio and Cleveland Academy of Trial Attorneys.
2613 N.E.2d 1014 (Ohio 1993).
31d. at 1025.
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long held, as a matter of law, that theaggravation of an injury by the subsequent
malpractice of a physician never breaks the chain of causation.4 Assuming that
the original tortfeasor was negligent and that his actions caused the original
injury, the only question left for the jury is whether the plaintiff herself
exercised reasonable care in seeking treatment by a qualified physician.5 This
rule was affirmed and given its common appellation, "the subsequent
tortfeasor rule," in Travelers Indemnityv. Trowbridge,6 where the courtheld: "[tihe
original tortfeasor is responsible for the negligence of the physician because
the tortfeasor's negligence created the risk (the injury) and the occasion for the
independent negligence of the physician."7 Since 18848 the rule in Ohio has
been that the subsequent negligence of a physician is foreseeable as a matter of
law and the question is not one for the jury.9
If the foreseeability of a physician's negligence occurring after a nurse's
negligence is a question for the jury, then either the Supreme Court has decided
that a nurse's duty is somehow different than all other duties in Ohio or the
Court has very discreetly overturned a century of Ohio case law.
I. THE SUPERSEDING CAUSE PROBLEM
The issue of superseding cause remains unclear. This can be seen by
comparing Ohio Jury Instruction 3 on superseding cause with Instruction 6 on
Superseding Responsible Cause.10 The two instructions, if taken as equally
valid propositions of the law, produce conflicting results in any case involving
the foreseeable negligence of a second tortfeasor.
The source for this discrepancy is the existence of two seemingly disparate
lines of cases which have developed on this issue. One line of cases, derived
from Mouse v. The Central Savings & Trust Co.11 and Mudrich v. Standard Oil.12
was recently affirmed in Cascone v. Herb Kay Co.13 Cascone gives the
generally-accepted test for superseding cause:
4Loeser v. Humphrey, 41 Ohio St. 378 (1884); Tanner v. Espey, 190 N.E. 229 (Ohio
1934).
5Loeser, 41 Ohio St. at 382.
6321 N.E.2d 787 (1975), owerruled on other grounds Motorists Mut. Ins. Co. v. Huron
Rd. Hosp., 653 N.E.2d 235 (Ohio 1995).
71d. at 790.
8Loeser v. Humphrey, 41 Ohio St. 378.
9Heintz v. Caldwell, (1898) 16 Ohio C.C. 680 (1898), Bendner v. Carr, 532 N.E.2d
178 (Ohio App. 1987).
101 O.JJI. 1130 (Anderson 1995).
11167 N.E. 868 (Ohio 1929).
1290 N.E.2d 859 (Ohio 1950).
13451 N.E.2d 815 (Ohio 1983).
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The test ... is whether the original and successive acts may be joined
together as a whole, linking each of the actors as to the liability, or
whether there is a new and independent act or cause which intervenes
and thereby absolves the original negligent actor.
14
The terms "new" and "independent" are defined in the Ohio Jury Instructions
as 11.33 based upon the discussion of these terms in Springsteel v. Jones &
Laughlin Steel Corp.15
The term 'Independent' means the absence of any connection or
relationship of cause and effect between the original and subsequent
act of negligence. The term 'new' means that the second act of
negligence could not reasonably have been foreseen.
16
Thus, for an intervening act of negligence to rise to the level of a superseding
cause thereby breaking the chain of causation and relieving the original
tortfeasor of liability, it must be both unrelated to the original act and
unforeseeable. The unforeseeability requirement is further explained in the
case citing in the Instruction:
It is not necessary that the defendant should have anticipated the
particular inJury. It is sufficient that his act is likely to result in injury
someone.
This test is in accord with the test propounded in the Restatement (Second) of
Torts, Section 447:
Negligence of intervening acts. The fact that an intervening act of a third
person is negligent in itself or is done in a negligent manner does not
make it a superseding cause of harm to another which the actor's
negligent conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about if (a) the
actor at the time of his negligent conduct should have realized that a
third person might so act or (b) a reasonable man knowing that the
situation existing when the act of the third person was done would not
regard it as highly extraordinary that the third person had so acted or
(c) the intervening act is a normal consequence of a situation created
by the actor's conduct and the manner in which it is done is not
extraordinarily negligent.
18
14 d. at 819.
15192 N.E.2d 81 (Ohio App. 1963).
161 O.J.I. 1130(3) (Anderson 1995).
17 Springsteel, 192 N.E.2d at 88.
18 RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) oF ToRTS § 447 (1965) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT].
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This also represents the approach of a majority of jurisdictions in the United
States.19
The instruction in O.J.I. 11.30, Section 6, however, presents a very
different test- If an independent and responsible party was aware of
the existing hazard and could or should have eliminated it, there is a
break in the chain of causation and the party who created the original
hazard is relieved from liability because of such intervention by the
other party.
20
This Instruction is based upon the oft-cited language of Thrash v. U-Drive-It:21
Where there intervenes between an agency creating a hazard and an
injury resulting from such hazard another conscious and responsible
agency which could and should have eliminated the hazard, the
original agency is relieved from liability.
22
While both these tests are offered as instructions to the jury to aid them in
deciding whether an intervening act of negligence is a superseding cause, they
can, in fact, only produce confusion. While both tests arguably include the
concept of "independence," the Cascone test turns on the question of
foreseeability while the Thrash test precludes consideration of foreseeability.
What then of the foreseeable negligent intervention of a responsible party?
The Restatement resolves this problem by recognizing that the Cascone test is
the general rule and the Thrash test is applicable only under certain
circumstances. The Restatement 452(2) of the Restatement outlines those
circumstances when the negligent conduct of a third party will work to release
the original tortfeasor of liability:
Where because of lapse of time or otherwise, the duty to prevent harm
to another threatened by the actor's negligent conduct is found to have
shifted from the actor to a third person the failure of the third person
to prevent such harm is a superseding cause.
23
The Reporter's Note more fully describes under what circumstances that may
happen:
One way in which the responsibility may be shifted is by express
agreement by the actor and the third person. By contract, by gratuitous
promise or by mere implication from what is agreed, it may be
19Comment Note, Annotation, Foreseeability as an Element of Negligence And Proximate
Cause, 100 A.L.R.2d 942 (1995).
201 O.J.1 11.30(b) (Anderson 1995).
21110 N.E.2d 419 (Ohio 1963).
221d. at 422.
2 3 RESTATEMENT § 462(2) (1965).
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understood that the third person has taken over full responsibility for
the situation and that the actor is relieved of his obligation.
24
While the Restatement offers a logical resolution to the problem of subsequent
third-party negligence, the question remains, is it the rule in Ohio?
Iml. THRASH REDUX
A close examination of the decision in Thrash reveals it was never intended
as a blanket statement of the law regarding superseding cause but rather a
decision limited to certain unusual situations.
In 1953, the law regarding products liability was still in its early stages. That
this was a primary concern of the court in Thrash is evidenced by its reference
to the "widely approved" decision in McPherson v. Buick Motor Co. 25 Thrash
involved the liability of the seller of a used car to an injured plaintiff who
purchased the car from an intervening buyer.
Thrash was, by its own terms, a limitation on the rule espoused in McPherson:
"certainly though, this rule is subject to limitation.126 It was an attempt to bring
under control the expanding area of products liability.
There is a significant portion of the now-famous language regarding the
"conscious and responsible agency" which precedes the oft-used quote, but is
usually not included: "Moreover, in the circumstances of this action, the
U-Drive-It Company may invoke the rule that .... 27
What, then, are the "circumstances" which distinguish the situation in Thrash
and permit the use of the test for superseding cause? The Thrash court takes
pains to distinguish it's facts from those of an earlier case, Penn. Railroad Co. v.
Snyder.28 In Penn Railroad Co., the Pennsylvania Railroad ran cars into Ohio that
were ultimately bound for Detroit. Penn allowed one of those cars onto the line
with a defective handhold at the top of a ladder. In Dayton, the cars were
transferred into the control of the Lake Shore & Michigan Southern Railroad
Company. Both Penn and Lake Shore admitted they had a duty to inspect the
cars and the jury found that the car was defective at the time it was delivered
to Lake Shore. Snyder, an employee of Lake Shore, climbed on the car after the
2 4 1d.
25111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916).
2 6 Thrash, 110 N.E.2d at 422.
2 7 The actual holding in Thrash is very fact-specific:
We conclude that where the owner of a used motor vehicle sells the
same "as is" to a dealer and those articles for such disposition as the
dealer may make of it, such owner may not ordinarily be held liable
for injuries occasioned to one who purchased the vehicle from the
dealer or for injuries to another because of false or imperfections in
the vehicle which existed or occurred during the time it was in the
possession of such owner.
Id. at 423.
2845 N.E. 559 (Ohio 1896).
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transfer and was injured because of the absent handhold. Prior to trial, Lake
Shore was dismissed as a defendant.
Penn Railroad contended that "[t]he causal connection was broken by the
intervening negligence of the Lake Shore Company.' 29 However, the court
held, that:
To relieve the latter from the consequences of its negligence, it is not
enough that the act of the Lake Shore Company was nearest in the
order of events to the injury, nor that without it the injury would not
have occurred; to have that effect it must have been the efficient,
independent, and self producing cause, disconnected from the
negligence of the plaintiff in error. The causal connection is not broken,
'if the intervening event is one which might in the natural course of
things be anticipated as not entirely improbable, and the defendant's
negligence is an essential link in the chain of causation.
30
This test, using independence and foreseeability as its criteria, is the same as
the Cascone test.
The Penn case featured a second conscious and responsible tortfeasor who
acknowledged a failure in it's duty to inspect. How, then, did it differ from the
situation in Thrash? The Thrash court itself explains the basis of the distinction:
Here, the U-Drive-It Company sold its used motor truck outright in
the condition it was and assumed no obligation and exercised no
control with respect to its future disposal.
31
The criteria upon which the Thrash court permitted the application of its
alternate rule parallels that of the Restatement.32 There was a contractual
relinquishment of duty in Thrash which served to sever liability.
Most cases which have followed Thrash have maintained this contractual
flavor.33 Generally, the Thrash exception has not been followed where the facts
stray from either an express or implied termination of duty.34
The primary application of the Thrash rule, outside of the contractual context,
can be found in the case cited in the Ohio Jury Instructions35 as the source of
the rule: Hurt v. Rogers Transportation Co.36 In Hurt, the Ford Motor Co. shipped
291d. at 561.
3 0 1d. at 562.
31Thrash, 110 N.E.2d at 423.
3 2 RESTATEMENT, supra note 22.
33Stamper v. Power Ruckman Home Town Motor Sales Inc. (1971), 25 Ohio St. 2d 1;
Oropesa v. The Hoffman Manufacturing Company (1965), 9 Ohio App. 2d 337; Ikerd v.
Lapsworth, 435 F.2d 197 (7th Cir. 1970).
34Neff Lumber v. First Nat'l Bank, 122 Ohio St. 302 (Ohio 1930).
351 O.J.I. 11.30(6) (Anderson 1995).
36Hurt v. Charles J. Rogers Transp. Co., 130 N.E.2d 824 (Ohio 1955).
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steel forgings in pallet boxes. These boxes were loaded onto a truck under the
supervision of Rogers and transported by one of Rogers' drivers, Carr.
During the trip, Carr became aware that the forgings were loose and
bouncing off the truck into the highway. He discovered a broken box and, in
order to repair it, he broke off boards from other pallet boxes and fastened them
to the broken box. Carr subsequently stopped his truck to repair a flat tire. At
that time, he noticed several steel forgings lying loose in the bed of the truck
which escaped from one of the boxes from which he had previously removed
some boards. Carr then continued on his journey and shortly after a forging
bounced off the truck and struck the plaintiff's automobile.
The Hurt court held that, based upon the facts of the case, Ford was entitled
to invoke the Thrash rule. In determining that Roger was a conscious and
responsible agency the court looked to the exclusive control Rogers had over
the shipment, Rogers' "actual knowledge of every claimed defect" and Carr's
own "willful" actions.37
The Sixth circuit explained the rational of Hurt in Lambert v. U.S.3 8 In Lambert,
the court, citing the "full knowledge" language of Hurt, found that the
intervening party's actual knowledge of the dangerous condition brought the
case in accord with the Hurt rule.39 The dissent in Lambert was more
forthcoming in it's Hurt analysis. After reiterating the general rule of Penn. Ry.
Co. v. Snyder, that a mere failure to remove or cure previous negligence does
not break the chain of causation, the dissent focused on the actions of Carr in
the context of his knowledge of the hazard:
In the Hurt case, the chain of causation was clearly broken by the gross
negligence of the company's driver, Carr, in continuing to drive the
trailer when he could see the forgings falling out and bouncing on the
highway.40
It would seem that the distinguishing characteristic of the Hurt rule is the
actual knowledge of the risk and the failure to utilize reasonable care despite
that knowledge on the part of the intervening defendant. Thus, in order to
invoke the Thrash rule, absent any contractual agreement to terminate a duty,
a defendant must show that a subsequent defendant, who itself had a duty to
prevent harm to the plaintiff, persisted in acting in an unreasonable manner
despite actual knowledge and appreciation of the risk. This, however, is
precisely the definition of a "willful" tort in Ohio. A willful tort "may be shown
by indifference to the safety of others, after knowledge of their danger, or
failure, after such knowledge, to use ordinary care".41
371d. at 828.
38Lambert v. United States, 438 F.d 1249 (6th Cir. 1971).
391d. at 1252.
401d. at 1269. (Dissent, Mc Allister).
4170 Ohio Jur. 3d Negligence § 34 (1986).
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This form of aggravated negligence has been widely recognized under the
various names of willful, wanton or reckless all of which invoke a higher
awareness of the risk than ordinary negligence. Prosser notes that in practice
the three terms have the same meaning and all relate to the "penumbra of what
has been called 'quasi-intent." 42 The terms all refer to conduct in which:
[T]he actor has intentionally done an act of unreasonable character in
disregard of a known or obvious risk that was so great as to make it
highly probable that harm would follow.43
That such an aggravated form of negligence, embracing both actual
knowledge of the risk and unreasonable conduct, can break the chain of
causation has also been widely recognized. The Restatement Section 452
Comment F44 states that in the absence of a contract or agreement certain
factors may still operate to cause a third party's failure to prevent harm to break
the chain of causation: "Among them are the degree of danger and the
magnitude of the harm, the character and position of the third person who is
to take the responsibility, his knowledge of the danger and the likelihood that
he will or will not exercise proper care."45
Viewed in this light, Hurt allows a more meaningful analysis of the terms
"conscious and responsible agency" used in the Ohio Jury Instructions.
Reasonable implies that the agency in question owes some duty to the plaintiff
to act with reasonable care to protect him from the complained of harm. This,
however, is a requirement for every action in negligence and, thus, adds
nothing to help distinguish those intervening negligent acts which break the
chain of causation from those which do not.
The term "conscious", in light of Hurt, obviously means more than a mere
physiologic state of being. "Conscious" implies the actual knowledge and
appreciation or "consciousness" of the risk coupled with a subsequent failure
to act in a reasonable manner, in other words, willful or reckless behavior.
This analysis coincides with that of Prosser who, in discussing the
requirements for an intervening cause to rise to the level of superseding,
describes a "group of cases [which] involve the situation in which a third person
fully discovers the danger, and then proceeds, in deliberate disregard of it."46
In Section F of the Reporter's Note to Section 452, the Restatement lists some
other factors which will cause a break in the chain of causation. Included in this
list is the existence of a special relationship between the third person and the
4 2 W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ONTHE LAW OF TORTS § 34, at 212 (5th
ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER].
43 Id.
44 RESTATEMENT § 452 (Anderson 1995).
45 d. Addressing this question directly the California Supreme Court in Stewart v.
Cox, 362 P.2d 345 (Cal. 1961), that"negligent conduct with full realization of the danger
may properly be considered highly extrodinary".
46PROSSER, supra note 42, § 44 at 318.
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plaintiff or defendant. Is the doctor/nurse relationship one of those special
relationships in which the doctor's subsequent negligence will cut off the
negligence of the nurse?
IV. NURSE'S DUTY IN OHIO
Up until the decision in Berdyck, a good argument could be made that a
doctor's subsequent negligence would cut off the negligence of a nurse. The
nurse's duty, historically in Ohio, has been seen as circumscribed in scope and
essentially derived from the authority of the physician.
Prior to 1964, it was recognized that the nurse had a duty to follow the orders
given by a doctor.4 7 In Richardson v. Doe,48 the court recognized that a nurse
was not required to use independent judgment and her primary duty was to
report signs and symptoms to the physician.49 This holding was reiterated in
Albain v. Flower HospitalSO The Albain court further set out the requirements a
plaintiff needs to meet in order to successfully prove causation in nursing
negligence. "[A] plaintiff must prove that, had the nurse informed the attending
physician of the patient's condition at the proper time, the physician would
have altered his diagnosis or treatment and prevented the injury to the
patient."51
The circularity of this reasoning should be obvious. In this tautology, nursing
negligence will never survive subsequent physician negligence. If the
physician errs because of the nursing negligence, the physician is not negligent.
If he errs regardless of the nursing negligence, then the negligence of the nurse
cannot, by definition, be causative. Simply put, nursing negligence can only be
causative where the physician is not negligent, and where the physician is
negligent, the nurse's negligence cannot be causative. The sharply
circumscribed duty of the nurse under Albain and Richardson, dependent as it
was on the knowledge and action of the physician, probably did fall under the
special relationship between the defendant and the third person contemplated
by the Restatement and, thus, under the rule of Thrash.
This was, in fact, the very question brought before the court in Berdyck. The
trial court in Berdyck granted summary judgment to defendant McGruder
Hospital. On appeal, the hospital argued that since Dr. Shinde admitted his
47Klema v. St. Elizabeth Hosp., 106 N.E.2d 765 (Ohio 1960).
48199 N.E.2d 878 (Ohio 1964).
49 d. at 880.
50553 N.E.2d 1038,1051 (Ohio 1990), overruled on other grounds by Clark v. Southview
Hosp. Family Health Ctr. 628 N.E.2d 46 (Ohio 1994) and Stovall v. Brown Memorial
Hosp., 1994 Ohio App. LEXIS 5703 (Ohio Ct. App., Ashtabula Cty. Dec. 16,1994).
51Albain, 553 N.E.2d at 1051.
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own negligence in failing to go to the hospital, his negligence must cut off the
nurse's negligence and be the sole proximate cause of the injury.52
The appellants argued that the nurse's duty was not limited to following
orders and transmitting information, but that the duty also extended to a duty
"to act with reasonable care in the discharge of her professional duties."53 The
Court of Appeals held that "nurses have a professional duty to exercise
ordinary and reasonable care to see that no unnecessary harm comes to his or
her patient."54
This issue, scope of the nurse's duty, was appealed to the Ohio Supreme
Court. The Ohio Nurses Association joined the appellants and argued, in their
amicus curiae brief, for the formal expansion of the nurse's duty in line with
the elements found in the Ohio Nurse Practice Act. The Ohio Supreme Court
affirmed the appellate court's holding that the "nurses are held to a greater
accountability than informing physicians and following their orders."55 The
court went so far as to suggest that in addition to the duty of performing a
competent nursing assessment, the nurse would be required to call
consultations with nursing supervisors or other physicians when she found a
physician's treatment to be in error.56 The court further held that there may be
an area where the duty of the physician and the nurse overlap. 57
By recognizing the nurse's independent duty of reasonable care to the
patient, the court extinguished the purely dependent relationship of the nurse's
duty on the physician's conduct. This recognition elevated the duty to the same
level as every other duty of reasonable care in Ohio. The impact, then, of the
court's invocation of the Cascone test at the end of the opinion was to decisively
remove nursing negligence from the realm of Thrash and subject it to the same
general rules as other forms of negligence. Thus, under Berdyck, nursing
negligence and physician negligence can co-exist and cooperate to result in
injury to a plaintiff in the same way other forms of negligence can. The test then
for whether subsequent physician malpractice breaks the chain of causation is
not the "intervention of a conscious and responsible agency" test of Thrash, but,
rather, the general rule that such intervention must be both independent and
unforeseeable.
V. SUBSEQUENT PHYSICIAN MALPRACTICE
If nursing negligence is, as suggested, on the same level as other forms of
negligence in Ohio, it must therefore be subject to the same rules of law as other
52Berdyck v. Shinde, No. 90-OT-060, 1991 Ohio App. LEXIS 5209 (6th Dist. Nov. 1,
1991), affd, 613 N.E.2d 1014 (Ohio 1993).
53 1d. at "11.
541d. at "18.
55Berdyck v. Shinde, 613 N.E.2d 1014, 1023 (Ohio 1993).
56 d. at 1024.
57Id. at 1023.
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forms of negligence. Ohio's view of subsequent physician negligence is in
accord with both the vast majority of jurisdictions and the Restatement.5 8
Section 457 of the Restatement states that an initial tortfeasor will always be
liable for the aggravation of an initial injury by subsequent medical
malpractice. The rationale for this view is found in Reporter's Note B:
However, there is a risk involved in the human fallibility of physicians,
surgeons, nurses and hospital staffs which is inherent in the necessity
of seeking their services. If the actor knows that his negligence may
result in harm sufficiently severe to require such services, he should
also recognize this as a risk involved in the other's forced submission
to such services, and having put the other in a position to require them,
the actor is responsible for any additional injury resulting from the
other's exposure to this risk.
59
As more colorfully put by Prosser: "It would be an undue compliment to the
medical profession to say that bad surgery is no part of the risk of a broken
leg."60
As previously stated, this rule was first embraced in Ohio in Loeser v.
Humphrey.61 Here, the court upheld jury instructions and specifically stated
that, if the defendant was found liable for the initial injury, then, as long as the
plaintiff acted reasonably in choosing a physician, defendant would be liable
for the aggravation of the injury caused by the physician's malpractice. 62 This
holding was reiterated in Tanner v. Espey and formulated into the Subsequent
Tortfeasor Rule in Travelers Indemnity v. Trowbridge. The same principle has been
extended to the situation where the initial negligence is itself an act of medical
malpractice and a plaintiff is then further injured by a subsequent act of
malpractice. 63 In Traster, the plaintiff was injured during a negligently
performed surgery and was subsequently further harmed by negligent
post-operative care. The court upheld as a valid statement of the law the
proposed jury instruction which stated, "[if a person suffers personal injuries
by reason of a surgeon's negligence and such harm is aggravated by the
negligence mistake, or lack of skill of a subsequent physician, then such
aggravation is a proximate result of the negligence of the original surgeon...,64
58RESTATEMENT § 457 (1%5).
5 91d. at cmt. b.
60PROSSER supra note 42.
6141 Ohio St. 378 (1884).
62Id. at 380-81.
63 Traster v. Steinreich, 523 N.E.2d 861 (Ohio Ct. App. 1987).
64Id. at 862. See also, Blanton v. Sisters of Charity, 79 N.E.2d 688 (Ohio Ct. App. 1948);
Shaw v. Donahue, 125 N.E.2d 368 (Ohio Ct. App. 1954).
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A similar result was arrived at in Savage v. Correlated Health Serv., Ltd.65 In
Savage, a referring orthopedic surgeon was held liable for the subsequent
negligent manipulation by a chiropractor. In finding the subsequent negligence
of the chiropractor was neither outside the causal relationship of the orthopedic
treatment nor was unforeseeable, the court found that, "[a]s a matter of law, the
intervening negligence of the chiropractor appellants was not an intervening
cause sufficient to interrupt the chain of causation."66 In Savage, the court, in
evaluating the "independent" requirement of the Cascone test, determined that
"Dr. Sveda's [the orthopedic surgeon] negligent advice regarding manipulation
made possible and brought about Dr. Schimmel's subsequent negligent act of
excessively forceful manipulation."67
Such so-called "passive negligence" has also been specifically addressed by
the courts in the context of successive medical negligence. In Harris v.
Middletown Radiologic Assoc.68 three practitioners successively failed to
diagnose a fractured vertebrae. The court found that:.
Because we are talking about identical passive negligence on all three
doctors' part, we conclude it does not satisfy the new and independent
causation requirement. Dr. Litle and Dr. Keifhaber are not accused of
creating some new or additional injury to appellee but of failing to
diagnose the same condition appellant initially failed to find.
69
Berdyck placed nursing negligence on the same footing as other negligent
acts in Ohio. As such, the Cascone test of independence and unforeseeability
must be used to determine if the subsequent negligent act will break the chain
of causation. In the case of subsequent physician negligence, however, Loeser,
Tanner, Travelers, and Traster state that such negligence is always foreseeable as
a matter of law. What then are the respective roles for the court and the jury in
determining whether the negligent actions of subsequent treating nurse or
physician constitute a superseding cause?
VI. THE ROLE OF THE COURT AND THE JURY
In Cascone, the Ohio Supreme Court adopted the approach of the Restatement
to this problem:
It is the exclusive function of the court to declare the existence or
non-existence of rules which restrict the actor's responsibility short of
making him liable for harm which his negligent conduct is a
65 No. CA 14491, 14498,1990 Ohio App. LEXIS 4590 (9th Dist. Oct. 17,1990), affd on
other grounds, 591 N.E.2d 1216 (Ohio 1992).
6 6 1d. at *8.
67/d.
68No. CA 86-05-069 (Ohio Ct. App. July 20,1987).
69 1d., slip op. at 5.
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substantial factor in bringing about, and to determine the
circumstances to which such rules are applicable.
70
Comments b and c of Section 453 further delineate the respective roles of the
court and jury.
b. If the facts are undisputed, it is usually the duty of the court to apply
to them any rule which determines the existence or extent of the
negligent actor's liability. If, however, the negligent character of the
third person's intervening act or the reasonable foreseeability of its
being done (see Sections 447 and 448) is a factor in determining whether
the intervehing act relieves the actor from liability for his antecedent
negligence, and under the undisputed facts three is room for
reasonable difference of opinion as to whether such act was negligent
or foreseeable, the question is for the jury.
c. If the evidence is so conflicting or contradictory as to leave room for
a reasonable difference of opinion as to the facts of the case, the court
should instruct the jury as to the applicability of such of the rules stated
in this Topic as are pertinent to such facts as the jury may reasonably
find from the evidence. Thus, if the liability of the actor depends upon
the wrongful character of the intervening act of the third person, the
judge should, if the evidence is conflicting, leave it to the jury to find
what the intervening actor did, and if there is a reasonable doubt as to
whether his act, as it might be found by the jury, was or was not
negligent, this question should also be left to them.
For successive acts of medical or nursing malpractice it is the domain of the
jury to resolve questions of fact and to determine whether there was negligence
present on the parts of both the antecedent and subsequent tortfeasors.
However, since the subsequent tortfeasor rule states that the simple negligence
of a physician which exacerbates an existing injury is always, as a matter of
law, foreseeable, there is never "room for reasonable difference of opinion as to
foreseeability" with simple medical or nursing malpractice.
In order for the subsequent malpractice of a nurse or physician to break the
chain of causation it must rise to the level of one of the exceptions noted in
Section 452(2). It would be the provence of the jury to determine whether the
facts of the case warrant such a finding and the provence of the court to then
apply the law of superseding cause.72
7OCascone, 451 N.E.2d at 820 (citing REsrATI mENT § 453).
7 1 RESTATEMENT § 453 cmt. b, c (1965).
72An example of this in the setting of multiple medical malpractice would arise
where a radiologist misreads an x-ray and the subsequent radiologist realizes the error
but fails to notify the treating physician. In such an instance, it would be the job of the
jury to determine whether such conduct rose to theJevel of willful or reckless behavior
and the job of the judge to apply the law of superseding cause in the appropriate way
depending on the answer. This approach has been taken in some Ohio cases. In Dillon
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VII. CONCURRENT V. SUCCESSIVE TORTFEASORS
The confusion over the role of superseding cause in cases of multiple medical
negligence has arisen, at least in part, from an attempt by defendants to cast
themselves as successive tortfeasors in order to escape the joint and several
liability incumbent upon concurrent tortfeasors. This view restricts concurrent
negligence to those acts committed simultaneously and reduces proximate
cause to a simple last in time test. The Ohio Supreme Court, however, has
explicitly stated what concurrence means in the context of a negligence action:
"Concurrent negligence consists of the negligence of two or more persons
concurring, not necessarily in point of time, but in point of consequence, in
producing a single indivisible injury."73 The subsequent tortfeasor rule is
simply the same principle in slightly different language.
Thus, where the subsequent negligence of a physician results in the
exacerbation of an existing injury, whether viewed as a successive or concurrent
tortfeasor, the result is the same. The physician is jointly and severally liable
for the injury with the original tortfeasor. The application of this rule was stated
in Blanton v. Sisters of Charity74 wherein the court held:
An operating surgeon and the hospital wherein the patient is operated
each sustain a relationship to the patient giving rise to a duty of care
running directly to each participant in the common enterprise, for the
violation or neglect of which, resulting in an injury to the patient, a
primary liability is created on the part of each, which neither could
escape by showing the other to be also guilty of a wrong.
75
This rule was recently applied in Miller v. Paulson76 where the court
overturned a successful defense motion for judgment not withstanding the
verdict. In Miller, the initial treating physician failed to make a proper diagnosis
and the subsequent treating physician failed to use the proper treatment. The
court, applying Blanton, held that the plaintiff need only prove "that the last
chance to treat the condition with the same possibility and degree of success
as was probable at the time of the alleged malpractice had passed at the time
v. Medical Ctr. Hosp., 648 N.E.2d 1375 (1993), the court found that a physician's
negligence did notasa matterof law, relieve thehospitalof its liabilityfor thenegligence
of its nurses, the extended lapse of time between the negligent events did. This, of course,
is in exact accord with § 452 (2) of the RESTATEMENT which specifically mentions lapse
of time as a factor which can break the chain of causation.
In Silberman v. Dubin, Appeal No. C-910650, 1993 Ohio App. LEXIS 130 (1st Dist.
Jan. 20,1993), the court, relying on Thrash, held that the chain of causation was broken
when one physician terminated his relationship with the patient and fully turned over
the case to another physician.
73 Garbe v. Halleron, 83 N.E.2d 217 (1948).
7479 N.E.2d 688 (1948).
75 Id. at 689.
76646 N.E.2d 521 (1994).
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of trial." 77 Thus, the court found that the "plaintiff may be able to sue defendant
for all of her damages irrespective of whether Dr. May's [the subsequent
treating physician] treatment was the proximate cause of those damages."78
In order to circumvent the burdens of joint and several liability, defendants
race to the top of the timeline because the defendant last in line bears the sole
liability. With Berdyck having eliminated the "special" nature of the
doctor-nurse relationship, the question of superseding cause should rarely
arise in the context of multiple medical negligence and should rarely serve as
a basis for a hospital to escape liability.
771d.
78Id.

